Secret Essays - The Secret Sharer, Joseph Conrad, Secret Sharer

Secret Sharer By Joseph Conrad "The Secret Sharer" by Joseph Conrad is a story of deep mysterious thought. The main character is a young captain who becomes aware that he does not yet know his ship, or his crew, or, indeed, himself. His character is one of complicated emotion and deep inner struggle. It's emphasis on the "double" (or alter ego) portrays the bond between an innocent person and one who is technically a criminal and reveals how easily the fates of each are interchangeable. Conrad has a unique style on which his specific diction and somewhat advanced vocabulary, coupled with complex sentence structure and plot development, hold the potential to confuse and frustrate the average reader. Conrad attempts to engage their minds and create original thought. In depth description is also very characteristic of Conrad's style and is found throughout "The Secret Sharer." Because of his stylistic writing, some readers may find themselves lost in his description and loose the story line in the process. It is, however, these ornate descriptions that Conrad uses to present his underlying meaning of his story. His character development is also somewhat established through this. There is a recurring theme to "The Secret Sharer." Alienation and repression of inner urges are the dominating themes. One can almost believe the young captain is so filled with uncertainty of himself that he manufactures a self-analytical double to help him find his way. From the beginning of the story Conrad begins to use symbolism. The first four paragraphs that set the place and time also include the first usage of symbolism. In the first paragraph Conrad describes the setting of the story and in doing so subtly lets it be known that the captain is feeling alone and different from the rest of his crew. For example, ".... For there was no sign of human habitation as far as the eye could reach." "To the left a group of barren islets...had its foundations set in a blue sea that itself looked solid, so still and stable did it lie below my feet." In these words Conrad could be saying how the captain feels that the sea is his only solid foundation in life, his stronghold and the one thing that is stable in his life. Through the description of the vast sea and open air Conrad portrays a man who feels alienated and insignificant. Repetition of the use of the word alone and metaphors of things and situations that cause loneliness are used throughout the entire introduction. The secret sharer of the captain's boat is an escaped murderer by the name of "Legatt." Legatt is physically and psychologically identical to the captain. Whether or not Legatt is real is something that will be debated by scholars for years to come. Did the captain simply create this other self to rid him of his loneliness? Was Legatt a way for him to express his inner urges to sin and rebel against society? If so then how do we explain the skipper of the ship "Sephora" looking for him? These are all legitimate questions that really only Conrad would know the answers to. They do, however, give us a basis for further discussion of symbolism in this story. One way to explore the symbolism of the story is through the sleeping suit that Conrad repeatedly refers to. When Conrad brings Legatt into the story he uses words that imply a fantasy or mystical world. For example, "the darkling glassy shimmer of the sea", "a faint flash of phosphorescent light... flickered in the sleeping water with the elusive, silent play of summer lightning in a night sky.", "his face, a dimly pale oval in the shadow of the ship's side." and "he appeared ghastly, silvery, fishlike." All of these passages strongly suggest the presence of a fairy tale like atmosphere. The illusions to light, shimmers of the water, and the references to Legatt being a "shadow of the ship's side" and "ghastly" imply that Legatt could very well be a figment of the captains imagination. He could have been developed in the captain's subconscious as a real person who ended up succeeding in providing companionship and living out the other "self" inside the captain. Legatt is exactly like the captain in all respects except for the fact that he is also the part of him that the captain has always repressed and hidden even from himself. He is the part that we all hide deep inside us. The part of us that wants to go against the grain and do

Arms and the Boy Essays

Arms and the Boy Essays Arms and the Boy Paper Arms and the Boy Paper Owen uses Imagery, language and verse form to present the death and suffering of the soldiers. He uses these techniques in other poems, too, to create an effective, conspicuous theme. In, Dulcet et Decorum est., Owen, straight away, uses Imagery to convey his feelings about the soldiers. He describes the soldiers as if theyre like old beggars under sacks and coughing like hags. The implication of the exhaustion creates the image hat the soldiers look like ill tramps; they no longer look like robust, young men because the endurance of suffering has changed them health wise and In appearance. This Is different from the poem, Arms and the Boy, because the soldiers do not change in their health or looks, but in their innocence. Owen informs his audience that there lurk no claws behind his fingers supple, which suggests that the soldier Is not harmful and would never kill anyone If the choice was his. Unfortunately, the choice Is not his and he has to kill and fight; some of his innocence is lost forever. A significant amount of tribulations and sufferings are listed in, Dulcet et Decorum est., which creates a slow, heavy rhythm. Owen Informs his audience that the soldiers all went lame; all blind; drunk with fatigue; deaf even to the hoots. This tired rhythm mirrors the soldiers and what they are feeling. Owen does this so that we can comprehend more effectively what the soldiers are going through Just by saying the poem out loud. The suffering Is also emphasizes because of how the sentence structure is formed. By listing the soldiers injuries and poor wellbeing, the effect is almost overwhelming because the audience has little time to take in all of the pain that the soldiers have to endure. This is different to the description of suffering in, Arms and the Boy, because Owen creates a calm tone, rather than a violent one. He does this by using the same verse form throughout the poem and uses a casual tone to convey his thoughts on war. In Dulcet et Decorum est., we know that Owens fellow soldiers have to live through this languishing life, but It is easy to forget that Owen himself suffers In a way that the others might not. Wilfred Owen had suffered from shell-shock in the war and a symptom of this is that he cannot escape from some helpless dreams; he talks about one dream he had where the dying man plunges at him guttering, choking, drowning. The diction creates a violent Image of a demented man who looks as If he is possessed just because of the frantic pain. Rather than thinking of himself as lucky that he was not the agonized man, Owen detests the fact that he was there, watching It, Ana NAS to level Walt It Slammer ascription Is uses In, Anthem Tort mea Youth, UT instead of the soldiers suffering, personification is used when the weapons are described as demented and wailing as if they are the ones being tortured and not the soldiers. The representation of death in, Dulcet et Decorum est., fits in well with the futility of war theme that Owen is trying to convey. Insignificance is implied through language when the soldiers flung the wretched man behind the wagon. The effect of this nugatory attitude illustrates to the audience that the death and suffering of the soldiers is forlorn and futile. A different attitude is implied in, Anthem for Doomed Youth. This is because it has much more of a holy theme throughout the poem, relating to a conventional and respectful funeral in contrast to the reality of dying a painful death. The representation of death in, Anthem for Doomed Youth constitutes a theme of disrespect and a mockery of religion. Towards the end of, Dulcet et Decorum est., Owen talks about eyes, referring to them as writhing in his face. This creates a sense of incapability to withstand this tormented pain and implies how much the soldier is actually suffering. An image is also created by Owens choice of words. This is completely different to the eyes mentioned in, Anthem for Doomed Youth, for they are illustrated as if there are soldiers spirits still living on by holy glimmers. There is a great contrast between the eyes mentions; one set are demented and are in fierce agony while others carry on friends spirits. To conclude, Owens use of various techniques effectively presents death and the suffering of soldiers as futile and harsh. The vile diction used creates violent images in, Dulcet et Decorum est.. Arms and the Boy and Anthem for Doomed Youth are not as effective in conveying Wilfred Owens feelings on death and suffering because they are not as graphic. The impure reality is Chorine Simpson Making Close reference to language, imagery and verse form, consider the ways in which death is presented in Dulcet et Decorum Est. Does Owen present the suffering of soldiers more or less effectively here than in other poems from the selection. Decorum est., Owen uses imagery, language and verse form to present the death and In, Dulcet et Decorum est., Owen, straight away, uses imagery to convey his feelings about the soldiers. He describes the soldiers as if theyre like old beggars under because the endurance of suffering has changed them health wise and in appearance. This is different from the poem, Arms and the Boy, because the soldiers ay not change In tenet Neal or looks, out In tenet Innocence. Owen Monitor Nils the soldier is not harmful and would never kill anyone if the choice was his. Unfortunately, the choice is not his and he has to kill and fight; some of his innocence which creates a slow, heavy rhythm. Owen informs his audience that the soldiers all poem out loud. The suffering is also emphasizes because of how the sentence his languishing life, but it is easy to forget that Owen himself suffers in a way that drowning. The diction creates a violent image of a demented man who looks as if he is possessed Just because of the frantic pain. Rather than thinking of himself as lucky it, and has to live with it. A similar description is used in, Anthem for Doomed Youth, also created Day Owens sconce AT words. I Nils Is completely Deterrent to ten eyes are not as graphic. The impure reality is shown in a more disgusting light in, Dulcet et Decorum est., which constitutes vivid images of powerful description.

The Organization System - Organizational Change and Stress Management Term Paper - 1

The Organization System - Organizational Change and Stress Management - Term Paper Example The response to the first and the ninth question indicates that physical exhaustion is the major reason which is pushing me towards job burnout while mental exhaustion is also taking over as indicated by the response towards the second and the last question. Everybody experiences job burnout at one point in their career. It is a kind of job stress which affects a person physically as well as emotionally. A person feels utterly exhausted and doubts his abilities and competence. Job burnout was identified in the early 1970s and since then has become a topic of study with researchers and psychologists trying to determine the various causes and factors which often leave a person frustrated and drained. Job burnout is a global problem but is treated differently in different societies. In some countries it is considered a social problem while others treat it as a medical problem. At first it was thought that job burnout was restricted to those workers involved in human services such as nur ses, policemen, social workers and legal workers etc. However, as further studies were carried out, it was noted that job burnout was not restricted to people associated with social and health services only; even entrepreneurs, managers and white and blue collared persons suffered from a deep sense of depression and depletion in their jobs (Schaufeli et al, 2009). Job burnout reduces productivity as the worker begins to question his own talents and abilities and fails to come up with any useful contribution let alone face challenges. Although job burnout is quite common and is a hazard that plagues every occupation, the professionals who suffer from this emotional trauma the most are those associated with the police department and nursing. Pines (2005) devised the Burnout Measure or the BM method comprises of twenty one items pertaining to feelings and attitudes such as physical exhaustion; feeling weak or sickly and losing sleep; emotional exhaustion such as feeling depressed and h opeless and mental exhaustion such as feeling worthless like a failure and disappointed with people (Pines 2005). The answers were judged on a scale of 1 to 7 with responses ranging from never to always. According to Pine, a score of 4 indicates a burnout. The BM is the most commonly used burnout inventory and also enjoys a high internal consistency. A study of correlation between various work stressors and BMS scores in table four showed that the work environment factors contributed strongly towards burnout. The people examined were Israeli Jews and Arabs who were involved in police work force, nursing or were MBA students. Table 4 showed the responses of the police workforce and it is evident that the personnel are experiencing high job burnout which may affect the safety in jails and prisons. Poor working conditions, under staffing which means working under pressure to complete tasks such as cell searches, inmate count, paper work, security rounds and apathy and lack of interest from superiors led to job dissatisfaction and growing negative feelings. The Burnout Measure devised by Pines is the second most important measure of job burnout; the first one being the Maslach Burnout Inventory which according to Schaufeli is the â€Å"gold standard to assess burnout† (Schaufeli et al, 2009). Researchers and practitioners view burnout differently; according to some, exhaustion is the only force behind job burnout

Video news release Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Video news release - Essay Example Through undertaking a survey of 77 television stations that broadcasts to 50% of the USA population, the CMD found that there were 36 video news release that were aired by these television stations incorporated and disguised as part of their own news, without disclosing to the audience the authentic source of the video news (). However, the major problem associated with the video news release is that the television stations that broadcasts these types of news fails to balance the clients news with their own independently researched footages, so as to present to the clients the actual status of the clients. More than 75% of the USA adult population depended on television news to be informed on what is happening around the world. Therefore, the television news that is aired on a daily basis has a great influence on the ability of the people to evaluate everything, ranging from consumer products to government policies (). The government has also been known for contributing the highest p ercentage of video news release that are aired by the television news, while political parties and other politically-based organizations are keen to broadcast their opinions to the public though the use of the video news release. There has been a recent controversy over the state of the video news release being incorporated within the normal news broadcast by televisions to the public, but the controversial debate has not deterred the television stations from continued airing of the fake news (). The controversy has led the U.S. Federal Communications Commission to investigate the conduct of the television stations that incorporates corporate clients or the government released video news release as their own news. This resulted to the issuance of the FCCs April 2005 Public Notice, which provided that the television stations must always disclose the sources of their news

iTunes and the Future of Music Essay Example for Free

iTunes and the Future of Music Essay Through its iTunes, iPod, and proprietary music software, Apple dominates the legal music download industry. But with the iPod contributing half of all the firm’s revenues, Apple faces intensifying competition posed by imitators such as the joint venture between Microsoft and MTV, and Samsung’s Helix. In addition to the competitive pressures, iPod also faces legal challenges. In France for example, legal enactments that compel firms with proprietary music management software to open their code to others are about to be passed. Such a law will also standardize formats across the industry so that songs from one vendor could be played on a digital player from any other system. Apple has also had to stare down the four largest record labels as far as pricing is concerned. While the four largest record labels preferred variable pricing in order to maximize earnings, Apple successfully argued for the flat 99 cents price which is more competitive (Boone and Kurtz, 2008, ch. 4). The success of Apple illustrates how commitment to the marketing orientation philosophy is useful in ensuring organizational success. Unlike the major record labels which insisted on selling music packaged in CDs, Apple realized that music consumers’ tastes and preferences had shifted in favour of the more convenient digital format, and developed a product around such needs. Through the strategy of product development as identified by the Ansoff Matrix, we see Apple adding on to its product line music videos, popular TV shows, and short movies (Mercer, 1996). Apart from the product, Apple also got other elements of its marketing mix right. In particular, its adoption of the flat $0. 99 price rather than the variable pricing pushed by major record labels ensures that the product remains competitive. Its ability to bundle together its three products the iPod, iTunes and proprietary music software is also a smart marketing gimmick that has enabled it to lock in customers (Boone and Kurtz, 2008, ch. 4). Apple derives its sustainable competitive advantage from its proprietary music software as well as its unique player iPod. By enacting laws that allow Apple’s rivals access to its code, and by standardizing formats across the industry so that songs from other vendors could play from the iPod and vice versa, the new regulations will in essence be eroding the source of the competitive advantage enjoyed by Apple in the digital music industry. For that reason, should the French legislation succeed, it would be better for Apple to pull iTunes out of the French market (Boone and Kurtz, 2008, ch. 4).

HIV and Aids in Sub Saharan Africa :: HIV in Africa

HIV and Aids in Sub Saharan Africa Introduction Sub Saharan Africa has a very serious HIV / AIDS epidemic with millions of its people living with the disease. It has now become a human tragedy in many areas of the world, but most affected is sub Saharan Africa. It is no coincidence that the countries suffering most with HIV / AIDS are also the poorest. HIV / AIDS is now considered to be the single most important impediment to social progress to many countries in Africa .This report will analyse the current situation using up to date sources from articles, books and the World Wide Web. UN Millennium development goals At the start of the new millennium, all 191 UN member states pledged to meet all the UN Millennium goals by the year 2015. These goals covered such issues as, poverty, hunger, education, aid, gender equality, child mortality, pre natal care, environmental sustainability and HIV / Aids. All UN states have agreed to, "Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS." (http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/). At Present, the HIV prevalence rates are still rising in sub Saharan Africa. The rate is seven ties higher in developing countries than it is in developed countries. Many different schemes are trying to reverse this trend. These schemes include,à ¢? ¦. Oxfam, who work to help ease developing world suffering believe that the only scheme that will help reduce HIV / AIDS in developing countries is to cancel world debt. "Unsustainable debt represents a huge barrier to progress in the fight against HIV / AIDS. Repayments to creditors by some of the poorest countries in the world are diverting the resources needed to respond to current suffering." (http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/debt_aid/bp25_debt_hivaids.htm) Oxfam and other similar organisations believe that countries with high prevalence rates could help them selves to solve the aids epidemic if they did not have to meet large debt repayments to the developed world. Concurring the epidemic Unfortunately this disease is not easily concurred. The disease is still today considered to be taboo, making it difficult to talk to

Aqr Delta Strategy Essay

DANIEL BERGSTRESSER LAUREN COHEN RANDOLPH COHEN CHRISTOPHER MALLOY AQR’s DELTA Strategy In the summer of 2011, the principals at AQR Capital Management met in their Greenwich, CT, office to decide how best to market their new DELTA strategy. After launching in the late summer of 2008, the DELTA strategy had compiled an excellent track record, but David Kabiller, a Founding Principal and the Head of Client Strategies at AQR, was frustrated that the fund had not grown faster in light of its exceptional performance. In Kabiller’s experience, the combination of a solid track record plus an innovative product usually led to explosive growth in assets under management (AUM), but that had not been the case so far with DELTA. The DELTA strategy was a product that offered investors exposure to a basket of nine major hedge fund strategies. The DELTA strategy was innovative in two ways. First, in terms of its structure, AQR implemented the underlying strategies using a well-defined investment process, with the goal of delivering exposure to a well-diversified portfolio of hedge fund strategies. Second, in terms of its fees, the new DELTA strategy charged relatively lower fees: 1 percent management fees plus 10 percent of performance over a cash hurdle (or, alternatively, a management fee of 2 percent only). This fee structure was low relative to the industry, where 2 percent management fees plus 20 percent of performance, often with no hurdle, was standard. These features, while distinct relative to other related â€Å"hedge fund replication† products, had yet to fully resonate with investors, and Kabiller needed to decide on a more effective marketing approach given the large number of competitors entering this space. AQR AQR was established in 1998 and headquartered in Greenwich, CT. The founding Principals of the firm included Clifford Asness, David Kabiller, Robert Krail, and John Liew, who had all worked together at Goldman Sachs Asset Management before leaving to start AQR. Asness, Krail, and Liew had all met in the Finance PhD program at the University of Chicago, where Asness’ dissertation had focused on momentum investing. AQR’s over 200 employees managed $24.0 Billion in assets. A large amount of these assets were invested in hedge fund strategies. Professors Daniel Bergstresser (HBS), Lauren Cohen (HBS), Randolph Cohen (MIT), and Christopher Malloy (HBS) prepared this case. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. Copyright  © 2011, 2012 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-5457685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to www.hbsp.harvard.edu/educators. This publication may not be digitized, photocopied, or otherwise reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School. 212-038 AQR’s DELTA Strategy Hedge funds Voor- en nadelen Hedge Fund: While open-end mutual funds had to register with the SEC, calculate and publish daily net asset values (NAVs), and provide investors with daily liquidity, hedge funds were not automatically regulated by the SEC and enjoyed as much flexibility as they could negotiate with their clients with respect to liquidity. In exchange for this light-touch regulation, hedge funds were restricted in their marketing: only high net worth and institutional investors could directly invest in these funds. Nevertheless, academic work had by the late 1990s established that hedge funds offered a risk exposure that was less correlated with broad market indexes than most mutual funds, and potentially offered high risk-adjusted returns. The performance of the hedge fund industry during the 2001-2002 recession was  particularly good; Exhibit 1 shows that while stock market indices (S&P and NASDAQ) fell dramatically during this period, broad hedge fund indices (e.g., DJCS_Hedge and HFRI_FW, which were designed to track the overall performance of the hedge fund industry) rose. In response to the perception that hedge funds truly offered outperformance, institutional money flowed into hedge funds during the late 1990s and 2000s, and the size of the industry grew rapidly. Exhibit 2 charts the growth in the number of funds and total AUM (assets under management) in the hedge fund industry since 1997. With this growth in assets and managers, questions began to surface about the role of hedge funds in a portfolio and whether there were other ways to capture those returns without being exposed to some of the negatives of hedge fund investing. Alternatives to hedge funds Although many investors were attracted to the possibility of obtaining high returns and/or low covariance with other investments in their portfolio, many still found hedge funds themselves to be unappealing. Among the reasons for their distaste were: a) illiquidity, b) minimum investment requirements, c) high fees, d) the difficulty of selecting the right hedge fund manager, e) the inability to gain access to high quality funds, and f) the lack of established benchmarks in the industry. Most hedge funds only allowed redemptions on certain dates – often at the end of each quarter. Additionally many funds had an initial lockup – that is, investors could not redeem from the fund for a set period after investing; the period was often one year though some funds had no lockup and others had locked up investors for as long as five years. Most funds also had a minimum investment size of at least $1 million. In addition, many investors found the fees charged by hedge funds, which often amounted to 2% of assets under management (some funds even charged the full cost of their operations to their funds, amounting to more than 2% management fees) plus an additional 20% of profits generated by the fund, to be excessive and hoped to obtain similar benefits at a lower cost. Some investors also found the idea of selecting a portfolio from the many thousands of available hedge funds to be an intimidating task, especially given the lack of transparency (both as to investment process and holdings) that was common among hedge fund managers. And of course even if  an investor could identify a set of funds that made up an attractive portfolio, the managers of those funds might not accept an investment at that time or from that investor. Finally, in contrast to the mutual fund industry, there was a lack of established benchmarks fo r hedge funds, making it difficult to assess skill versus luck and idiosyncratic versus systematic returns. While hedge fund indices existed, these were just peer groups, not true benchmarks, and were biased by a number of things, including style drift and survivorship bias. In response to these criticisms, alternative products were soon introduced into the marketplace. 2 AQR’s DELTA Strategy 212-038 Funds of Hedge Funds (FOFs) One popular alternative to direct hedge fund investing was the funds of hedge funds (FOFs) structure. FOFs aimed to take investors’ money and allocate it among a select group of hedge funds – sometimes among a small number (even in the single digits in some cases), and sometimes among hundreds of funds. onerous= burdensome/ heavy This approach solved a number of the issues facing hedge fund investors, especially those with modest capital. FOFs had less onerous liquidity rules than individual hedge funds, and FOFs were less likely to encounter liquidity problems than individual funds since they could obtain liquidity from a number of underlying funds. Still, FOFs were ultimately subject to the underlying liquidity (both with respect to liquidity terms and underlying holdings) of the funds they were investing in. In addition, a single minimum investment bought a portfolio of many funds, and an experienced and hopefully expert financial professional, or team of such professionals, selected the funds, and chose allocations among them that (presumably) produced a well-optimized portfolio. Finally, FOF managers  claimed that their experience and connections provided access to hard-to-enter funds. Thus FOFs presented an appealing package, and indeed close to half of all money invested in hedge funds came through F OFs. However, many investors were put off by FOF fees, which historically included an additional layer of fees often as high as half the level of hedge fund fees themselves (thus making total fees paid about 1.5 times higher than for direct investing). Multi-strategy Funds Another approach to obtaining an alternative-investment portfolio while avoiding some of the challenges of one-strategy-at-a-time creation was to invest in multi-strategy hedge funds. Such offerings were often made by large hedge fund firms that offered a variety of individual strategies. Investors might have the option to invest in a multi-strategy fund that allocated assets across the different silos within the firm. One major advantage of multi-strategy funds over FOFs was fees: multi-strategy funds typically did not charge an additional fee layer over and above the hedge fund fee (as FOFs did). Further, multi-strategy funds only charged performance fees when the total investment was in the money; whereas, in the case of FOFs and direct single strategy investments, an investor could be subject to performance fees even if the net, aggregate performance wasn’t positive. A second potential advantage of multi-strategy funds was in portfolio construction. Not only was the allocation among strategies performed by professionals, those professionals likely had a high level of insight and visibility into the opportunities available to the individual silo managers. Multi-strategy funds generally offered as good or better liquidity than individual-strategy funds, and of course there was no trouble gaining â€Å"access† to the underlying managers. Multi-strategy funds appeared to offer strong diversification, although in the famous case of the hedge fund Amaranth, investors thought they were investing in a diversified portfolio of strategies. However, extreme losses in one of the portfolio’s silos led to the loss of approximately 75% of total portfolio value. Consequently many investors felt they were not truly diversified if they had a large allocation to a multi-strategy fund, but this could be potentially mitigated through the right amount of transparency into the positions and  risks of the portfolio, or, of course, through diversification among several different multi-strategy funds, thereby minimizing single firm risk. silos= opslagplaatsen 3 212-038 AQR’s DELTA Strategy One potential concern with multi-strategy funds from the investor’s point of view was the question of portfolio manager quality. Although it was possible that a single firm could gather under one roof the very best managers in a variety of specialties, some investors found this implausible. Hedge fund replication Starting in 2006, a number of investment management firms also introduced â€Å"hedge fund replication† products. These strategies, implemented using liquid instruments, purported to give investors a ‘top-down’ exposure to the broad risk exposures of the hedge fund industry. These products could be viewed as an effort to provide ‘hedge fund beta,’ or the systematic part of hedge fund performance. The rationale for these products originated from studies of hedge fund returns that highlighted the idea that the line between ‘alpha’ and ‘beta,’ was potentially fluid. The alternative systematic exposures of hedge funds could be viewed as a kind of â€Å"exotic beta.† If hedge fund returns could be approximated with dynamically traded portfolios of liquid assets, then investors attracted to hedge fund returns, but potentially looking for a liquid or low-fee alternative to actual hedge funds could invest in a ‘hedge fun d replication’ product that attempted to mimic hedge fund returns using liquid assets. These top-down approaches aimed to use statistical methods to create a portfolio of liquid assets that had similar performance to hedge funds as a class. One top-down approach was to use linear regressions, or optimizations, to build a portfolio that had high correlations to historical hedge fund returns. An example of this  approach consisted of three steps. First one would obtain a long-run time series of returns on a diversified portfolio of hedge funds (e.g., the HFRI monthly hedge fund indices were commonly used). Then one would obtain returns on a large number of liquid investments-these could be indexes of stocks (e.g., S&P 500, MSCI EAFE, MSCI Emerging, Russell 2000, etc.), bonds (e.g., US 10-year government bonds), currencies (e.g., EUR-USD Spot Exchange Rate), etc. () Finally, one would use a standard statistical optimizer, or linear regression, to find the portfolio of liquid investments (either long or short and at weights implied by the statistical analysis) that most closely replicated the statistical characteristics of the hedge fund portfolio. Exhibit 3 presents the monthly returns from a set of indices that were commonly used for hedge fund replication purposes. 1 Specifically, the goal was to create a portfolio that historically moved as close to one for one with the hedge fund portfolio, so that it had high correlation with the hedge fund portfolio, and yet also matched other â€Å"statistical moments,† such as volatility, skewness, and kurtosis. Historically, and ideally on a forward-looking basis as well, this portfolio would fulfill a role in the diversified portfolio similar to the role that hedge funds would play. Exhibit 4 plots the recent return performance of a few commonly used hedge fund indices (e.g., DJCS_Hedge, HFRI_FW, and HFRX_Global), which represent composite indices of individual hedge funds and were designed to track the overall return performance of the industry; as well as a fund-ofhedge funds (FOF) index (HFRI_FOF) designed to track the overall return performance of funds of hedge funds. Exhibit 5 presents the return performance of four popular hedge fund replication index products, produced by Merrill Lynch, G oldman Sachs, JP Morgan, and Credit Suisse. Exhibit 6 presents the return performance of the overall hedge fund indices alongside the performance of these hedge fund replication products. 1 This is an excerpt of the data. The full data series is in the Spreadsheet Supplement to the case. 4 AQR’s DELTA Strategy 212-038 AQR’s approach For years, the principals at AQR had been working on understanding the underlying nature of hedge fund returns and exploring the possibility of being able to capture them in a transparent, liquid and cost effective way. Thus, they were initially intrigued by the introduction of these hedge fund replication products, but very soon came to the conclusion that an entirely different approach to delivering exposure to the systematic risk factors of the hedge fund industry was needed. Whereas AQR’s competitors focused on the ‘top-down’ products described above, AQR focused on creating a ‘bottom-up’ approach that sought to deliver significant risk-adjusted returns instead of simply replicating an index by: capturing classical, liquid hedge fund strategies that were uncorrelated with traditional markets, implementing them at low cost, and then bundling these strategies into a wellconstructed single portfolio focusing on portfolio construction, risk management and trading. Origins of AQR’s approach The idea of direct, simplified implementation of core hedge fund strategies was hinted at by the pioneering work into merger arbitrage of Mark Mitchell and Todd Pulvino. Mitchell and Pulvino were both former academics (at Harvard Business School and the Kellogg School of Management, respectively) who subsequently teamed up with AQR in 2001. A simple merger arbitrage strategy, for example, worked as follows: after the announcement by Firm A of a desire to acquire Firm B, the merger arbitrageur made a purchase of the target Firm B shares while shorting the acquirer Firm A’s shares (if the acquisition was to be made in cash, the arbitrageur merely purchased Firm B shares without shorting Firm A). Typically upon the announcement of the merger, the price of the target shares would not rise all the way to the price that would be appropriate if the merger were sure to be completed. When Mitchell and Pulvino studied the merger arbitrage industry, they found that merger arbitrage strategies did deliver substantial risk-adjusted returns. Specifically, the expected returns of putting merger arbitrage  investments into place was high, and while the risk was higher than one might naturally have expected — because mergers tended to break up exactly at times of market stress, and therefore the merger arbitrage strategy had more beta, or market exposure, than might be presumed — nevertheless they found that even accounting for this risk, the performance of a naà ¯ve merger arbitrage strategy that invested in every deal was substantial. Mitchell and Pulvino also looked at the performance of actual merger arbitrage funds. A merger arbitrage fund would be expected to add alpha by correctly identifying which mergers were more or less likely to achieve completion than the market anticipated. So, for example, if the market pricing of a deal was such that the expected return would be zero if the merger was 90% likely to be completed, the merger arbitrageur’s job was to try to figure out whether in fact the merger was substantially more than 90% likely to go through, substantially less than 90%, or about 90%, and then invest only in those deals that were substantially more than 90% likely to go through. What Mitchell and Pulvino found was that merger arbitrage funds made money, but that they did not show an ability to forecast which mergers would close over and above the market’s ability. That is, the outperformance that merger arbitrageurs were generating was no greater than the outperformance that would be generated by a simple strategy that bought every target and shorted every bidder, particularly net of fees. 5 212-038 AQR’s DELTA Strategy This opened the door to a potential strategy for the replication of merger arbitrage: simply participate in every merger arbitrage deal that met a set of basic screens (e.g., size and liquidity). The benefit to investors would be a potentially more diversified portfolio of merger deals than would be obtained from a fund manager who only selected a subset of the deals, and also potentially far lower fees, because there was no need to pay an analyst  to determine which mergers were more or less likely to succeed. With this as a template, one could easily imagine a whole roster of potential hedge fund strategies that could be captured in a systematic way (e.g., long value stocks and short growth stocks, convertible arbitrage, carry trades, trend following trades and trades exploiting other wellknown empirical asset pricing anomalies). Since the early work into merger arbitrage, AQR had spent years researching these other classical hedge fund strategies that could be captured from the bottomup. Bottom-Up versus Top-Down AQR preferred their bottom-up approach for a variety of reasons. First, they felt that many hedge fund strategies earned returns for bearing a liquidity risk premium, which you could not earn by trading solely in liquid instruments as in the hedge fund replication methods. For example, in order to capture the returns from a convertible bond that traded at a discount to fair value because of a liquidity risk premium, you needed to own the convertible bond, not simply liquid assets that were correlated with the convertible bond. Second, since top-down methods aimed to maximize correlations with recent past hedge fund performance, these approaches were necessarily backwardlooking and based on what hedge funds were doing in the past. By contrast, if you ran the actual strategies, one could respond to market opportunities immediately. Finally and perhaps most importantly, AQR felt that the hedge fund indices upon which most top-down replication strategies were based had a variety of biases (e.g., survivorship bias), had too much exposure to traditional markets (i.e., equity and credit beta) and also tended to reflect the weights of the most popular strategies. Since these popular strategies were crowded with many trades, the expected returns on these strategies going forward were potentially lower. In short, while they shared the noble goals of top-down replication products (i.e., attempting to provide liquid, transparent exposure to hedge fund strategies at a lower fee), AQR felt that the approach had fundamental flaws or, as Cliff Asness put it in a speech in October 2007 on hedge fund replication, â€Å"Not Everything That Can Be Done Should Be Done.† AQR’s DELTA Strategy In late 2007, AQR decided to focus their years of research on capturing the classical hedge fund strategies in a systematic way from the bottom up by â€Å"creating our own product that would seek to deliver these strategies in a risk-balanced and efficiently implemented way.† AQR viewed their â€Å"DELTA† product as superior to the newly-introduced replication products that were being marketed as offering ‘hedge fund beta.’ In fact, AQR staff bristled at comparisons between the existing hedge fund replication products and their DELTA product. To ensure that AQR was taking a broad approach and to avoid being insular, they formed an external advisory committee made up of some very seasoned hedge fund investors to help guide the development of the product. The DELTA name was an acronym that reflected the product’s characteristics: ‘Dynamic, Economically Intuitive, Liquid, Transparent and Alternative.’ The portfolio was designed to be uncor related with the overall stock market, and would be diversified across nine broad strategy classes: a Fixed Income Relative Value strategy, a Managed Futures strategy, a Global Macro strategy, insular = bekrompen 6 AQR’s DELTA Strategy 212-038 an Emerging Markets strategy, a Long/Short equity strategy, a Dedicated Short Bias strategy, an Equity Market Neutral strategy, a Convertible Arbitrage strategy, and an Event Driven strategy. Performance AQR decided to go ahead with the creation of the DELTA strategy in the late summer of 2008. By October 1, 2008, the portfolio was fully invested and had begun to compile a track record. At the time, the staff at AQR had worried that this might be â€Å"the worst possible time to be launching a product designed to capture classical hedge fund strategies.† Nonetheless, the DELTA  portfolio performed well in the fourth quarter of 2008 immediately after its launch, an impressive feat given the turbulence in the market. Exhibit 7 charts the monthly performance of the DELTA strategy since inception. Exhibit 8 shows the raw monthly returns of the DELTA strategy, compared to the raw monthly returns of stock market indices (S&P and NASDAQ) and broad hedge fund indices (e.g., DJCS_Hedge and HFRI_FW, which were designed to track the overall performance of the hedge fund industry). Exhibit 8 also presents the â€Å"beta† of the DELTA strategy with respect to these various market and hedge fund indices, while Exhibit 9 graphs the cumulative return performance of the DELTA strategy relative to these indices. Marketing DELTA Although DELTA was off to a great start, Kabiller felt like it was underperforming its potential. By the summer of 2011, despite its excellent performance, growth in DELTA’s AUM had been modest. After giving it a lot of thought, Kabiller identified three primary challenges AQR faced in convincing investors to allocate capital to DELTA. First, many of his institutional clients had grown very comfortable selecting a set of hedge funds and paying them both management and performance fees. Exhibit 10 presents the recent annual returns of some of the largest U.S. hedge funds, many of whom had delivered stellar returns over time. Kabiller was convinced that one of DELTA’s major assets was its ability to deliver hedge fund returns with a significantly lower fee structure. But many of his institutional clients had difficulty assessing just how large an advantage this provided DELTA. For instance, if a client selected the two percent management fee with no performance fee struct ure, how much higher could they expect their after-fee returns to be? Given that performance fees were typically only paid on returns in excess of a cash hurdle, was a twenty percent performance fee really that costly to fund investors? Related considerations applied to investors that invested primarily through Funds of Hedge Funds. These investment vehicles typically added a layer of fees on top of the after-fee performance of their hedge fund investments – typically a one percent management fee and a ten percent performance fee. Due to DELTA’s multi-strategy investment approach, its after-fee performance should perhaps be benchmarked against those of fund-of-funds alternatives. Conveying to such investors the fee advantage of DELTA in simple terms – for instance, how much better their competitors’ pre-fee returns needed to be than those of DELTA to offset the fee differential – would go a long way in convincing them that DELTA was the superior approach. A second challenge in marketing DELTA was the emergence of the so-called hedge fund replication strategies. These strategies were almost the polar opposite of the fund-of-funds – they had modest fees and, because they replicated hedge fund returns using highly liquid indices, they faced little in the way of liquidity risk. Institutional investors interested in low-fee exposure to hedge fund returns found these products attractive, and Kabiller found it challenging to convey the advantages of the DELTA approach. His inclination was to focus on two key limitations of hedge fund replication. First, he felt they relied heavily on the historical relationship between hedge fund returns and major stock and bond market indices. To the extent that the relationship was not stable, 7 212-038 AQR’s DELTA Strategy or to the extent that a large fraction of hedge fund movements could not be captured by an appropriate combination of these indices, the replication approach would be limited in its ability to truly deliver in real time the actual returns being earned by the average hedge fund investor. Second, even if the strategy could replicate a large fraction of the monthly fluctuations in performance of the average hedge fund, Kabiller felt it was likely that a â€Å"top-down† approach would be limited in replicating the actual edge, or â€Å"alpha,† of the average hedge fund. Even if much of the risks to which hedge funds were exposed could be found in broad stock and bond market indices, it was unlikely that any of the informational or liquidity edges they possessed would appear in the returns of these indices. A final challenge Kabiller faced in the marketing of DELTA was its track record. Although it had outpaced the broad HFRI index since its inception in the fall of 2008, th e track record was still a fairly limited one. Moreover, since the central appeal of the product was its ability to match average hedge fund returns  with modest fees, the outperformance ironically posed something of a challenge for DELTA. Kabiller felt it would be critical to understand its source before determining whether it was an aberration or whether they possessed a sustainable edge relative to the index of hedge funds. As Kabiller looked out beyond his infinity pool and into the calm waters of the Long Island Sound, he worried that without a proper grasp of these issues, many rough sales meetings lay ahead for him and his DELTA team. 8 AQR’s DELTA Strategy 212-038 Exhibit 1 Cumulative Return Performance of Hedge Fund Indices versus Stock Market Indices, since 1996. Cumulative Return Performance of Hedge Fund Indices Versus Stock Market Indices 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 199601 199609 199705 199801 199809 199905 200001 200009 200105 200201 200209 200305 200401 200409 200505 200601 200609 200705 200801 200809 200905 201001 201009 201105 NASDAQ S&P_Index DJCS_Hedge HFRI_FW Source: Bloomberg. 9 212-038 AQR’s DELTA Strategy Exhibit 2 Total Number of Hedge Funds and Total AUM (Assets Under Management) for the Hedge Fund Industry, since 1997. Growth in Hedge Fund Industry (1997-2010) 12,000 $2,500.00 10,000 Number of Hedge Funds 8,000 $1,500.00 6,000 $1,000.00 4,000 $500.00 Hedge Fund AUM (in Billions $) $2,000.00 Number of Hedge Funds Hedge Fund AUM 2,000 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 $- Source: Created by casewriters using data from Hedge Fund Research, www.hedgefundresearch.com, accessed August 2011. 10 212-038 -11- Exhibit 3 Excerpt of Monthly Returns on Indices Commonly Used for Hedge Fund Replication (1996-2011). The full data series is contained in the Spreadsheet Supplement to the case MSCI EM 7.6% -0.6% 1.1% 5.2% 0.1% 0.9% -6.2% 2.6% 1.4% -1.4% 1.7% 1.0% †¦ -2.1% -1.4% 4.3% 0.8% -1.6% -1.9% -0.9% -7.3% -7.4% 9.1% -3.8% 0.0% 7.4% 3.9% 7.0% 6.2% -2.5% 0.5% 15.0% -0.5% 0.5% 10.9% -0.2% 1.0% 4.5% -8.7% -4.3% -8.8% -11.4% -5.4% -7.0% -1.3% -1.2% -3.5% -2.0% -2.5% -3.7% -1.1% -1.7% -2.0% 0.4% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% -2.8% 2.0% 2.4% 2.6% 0.0% 3.0% -0.1% 0.5% 1.6% 2.4% -0.3% 5.4% 2.4% 3.4% 0.2% -0.1% -0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 2.7% -0.7% 3.3% 5.7% 2.8% -2.0% 1.3% 2.0% 0.8% 4.0% -0.7% †¦ 4.0% 2.4% †¦ 7.6% -2.0% †¦ 0.8% 0.0% †¦ 2.8% -2.1% †¦ 4.6% -1.2% 3.7% -1.7% 5.6% 2.8% 0.9% 1.2% 2.2% 2.9% 0.9% 4.1% 0.4% 0.0% †¦ -0.7% -0.2% 1.1% 1.7% -0.9% -0.8% 0.6% -1.2% 1.4% 0.0% 1.0% 0.3% 0.0% 1.0% -4.9% 0.9% -4.2% -8.8% 5.7% 0.4% -4.4% 2.1% 0.8% 0.4% 0.4% 1.5% 0.0% -0.5% -0.3% -1.0% -1.4% 3.5% -1.2% 5.3% 3.9% 1.5% 2.6% 0.0% 0.2% -1.7% -0.6% 4.5% -1.4% -1.0% 2.8% 3.0% 1.8% 0.9% 1.0% -0.5% -0.2% -3.6% -1.1% -3.7% -0.3% 3.7% -0.2% 3.4% 0.9% 0.4% 5.1% MSCI EAFE RUSSELL 2000 S&P 500 US TREAS 2YR US TREAS 10YR CURRENCY HFRI HFRI FOF HFRI FW 1/31/1996 1.1% 2.7% 2.9% 2/29/1996 3/29/1996 2.8% 1.9% -0.6% 1.0% 1.2% 1.5% 4/30/1996 5/31/1996 5.3% 3.7% 3.1% 1.5% 4.0% 3.1% 6/28/1996 7/31/1996 8/30/1996 -0.7% -2.9% 2.6% 0.4% -1.9% 1.5% 0.2% -2.1% 2.3% 9/30/1996 10/31/1996 2.2% 1.6% 1.2% 1.6% 2.1% 1.0% 11/29/1996 12/31/1996 †¦ 1.7% 0.8% 2.3% 0.7% †¦ 2.1% 1.3% †¦ 1/31/2011 2/28/2011 0.4% 1.3% 0.1% 0.8% 0.4% 1.2% 3/31/2011 4/29/2011 0.5% 1.3% -0.1% 1.2% 0.1% 1.5% 5/31/2011 6/30/2011 7/29/2011 -1.3% -1.3% -0.3% -1.1% -1.3% 0.4% -1.2% -1.2% 0.2% 8/31/2011 9/30/2011 -4.9% -6.0% -2.6% -2.8% -3.2% -3.9% 10/31/2011 11/30/2011 12/30/2011 4.9% -2.0% -0.9% 1.1% -1.0% -0.4% 2.7% -1.3% -0.4% 1/31/2012 3.8% 1.9% 2.6% Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. 212-038 AQR’s DELTA Strategy Exhibit 4 Cumulative Return Performance of Overall Hedge Fund Indices, since June 2007. Recent Performance of Hedge Fund Indices 120 110 100 DJCS_Hedge 90 80 70 60 200706 200708 200710 200712 200802 200804 200806 200808 200810 200812 200902 200904 200906 200908 200910 200912 201002 201004 201006 201008 201010 201012 201102 201104 201106 HFRI_FW HFRX_Global HFRI_FOF Source: Bloomberg. 12 AQR’s DELTA Strategy 212-038 Exhibit 5 Cumulative Return Performance of Hedge Fund Replication Indices, since June 2007. Recent Performance of Hedge Fund Replication Products 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 200706 200708 200710 200712 200802 200804 200806 200808 200810 200812 200902 200904 200906 200908 200910 200912 201002 201004 201006 201008 201010 201012 201102 201104 201106 ML GS JPM CS Source: Bloomberg. 13 212-038 AQR’s DELTA Strategy Exhibit 6 Comparison of Cumulative Return Performance of Overall Hedge Fund Indices versus Hedge Fund Replication Indices, since June 2007. Comparison of Recent Performance of Hedge Fund Indices Versus Hedge Fund Replication Products 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 200706 200708 200710 200712 200802 200804 200806 200808 200810 200812 200902 200904 200906 200908 200910 200912 201002 201004 201006 201008 201010 201012 201102 201104 201106 DJCS_Hedge HFRI_FW HFRX_Global HFRI_FOF ML GS JPM CS Source: Bloomberg. 14 AQR’s DELTA Strategy 212-038 Exhibit 7 Monthly Return Performance of AQR DELTA strategy, Since Inception. AQR DELTA Return Performance 5.00% 4.00% 3.00% 2.00% 1.00% 0.00% -1.00% -2.00% -3.00% -4.00% Source: Company documents. 15 212-038 AQR’s DELTA Strategy Exhibit 8 Monthly Return Performance (and Beta) of AQR DELTA strategy compared to Market Indices (S&P, NASDAQ) and Hedge Fund Indices (DJCS_Hedge, HFRI_FW), since October 2008. Date 200810 200811 200812 200901 200902 200903 200904 200905 200906 200907 200908 200909 200910 200911 200912 201001 201002 201003 201004 201005 201006 201007 201008 201009 201010 201011 201012 201101 201102 201103 201104 201105 Average DELTA 1.22% 1.72% 4.05% 2.79% -0.10% 2.32% 3.09% -0.35% 1.78% 1.93% 4.48% 2.70% -0.31% 0.96% 0.55% -0.66% -0.27% 2.23% 2.18% -3.37% 1.39% 1.62% 2.02% 3.33% 2.47% 1.03% 1.93% -0.41% -0.45% 0.92% 2.31% -0.84% 1.32% NASDAQ -17.73% -10.77% 2.70% -6.38% -6.68% 10.94% 12.35% 3.32% 3.42% 7.82% 1.54% 5.64% -3.64% 4.86% 5.81% -5.37% 4.23% 7.14% 2.64% -8.29% -6.55% 6.90% -6.24% 12.04% 5.86% -0.37% 6.19% 1.78% 3.04% -0.04% 3.32% -1.33% 1.19% 0.09 0.25 0.28 S&P_Index -16.94% -7.48% 0.78% -8.57% -10.99% 8.54% 9.39% 5.31% 0.02% 7.41% 3.36% 3.57% -1.98% 5.74% 1.78% -3.70% 2.85% 5.88% 1.48% -8.20% -5.39% 6.88% -4.74% 8.76% 3.69% -0.23% 6.53% 2.26% 3.20% -0.10% 2.85% -1.35% 0.64% 0.09 0.28 0.32 DJCS_Hedge -6.30% -4.15% -0.03% 1.09% -0.88% 0.65% 1.68% 4.06% 0.43% 2.54% 1.53% 3.04% 0.13% 2.11% 0.88% 0.17% 0.68% 2.22% 1.24% -2.76% -0.84% 1.59% 0.23% 3.43% 1.92% -0.18% 2.90% 0.69% 1.38% 0.12% 1.80% -0.96% 0.64% 0.25 HFRI_FW -6.84% -2.67% 0.15% -0.09% -1.21% 1.66% 3.60% 5.15% 0.25% 2.50% 1.30% 2.79% -0.20% 1.52% 1.28% -0.76% 0.66% 2.49% 1.19% -2.89% -0.95% 1.61% -0.13% 3.48% 2.14% 0.19% 2.95% 0.41% 1.23% 0.06% 1.45% -1.18% 0.66% 0.25 DELTA’s Beta with: DJCS_Hedge’s Beta with: HFRI_FW’s Beta with: Source: Company documents. 16 AQR’s DELTA Strategy 212-038 Exhibit 9 Cumulative Return Performance of AQR DELTA Strategy versus Market Indices (S&P and NASDAQ) and Hedge Fund Indices (DJCS_Hedge and HFRI_FW), since October 2008 Cumulative Return Performance of DELTA versus Market and Hedge Fund Indices 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 DELTA NASDAQ S&P_Index DJCS_Hedge HFRI_FW Source: Bloomberg and company documents. 17 212-038 -18- Exhibit 10 Annual Returns of Largest Hedge Funds (%) Fund Name Winton Futures USD Cls B Millennium International Ltd Transtrend DTP – Enhanced Risk (USD) The Genesis Emerging Mkts Invt Com A Aspect Diversified Programme Aurora Offshore Fund Ltd. Permal Macro Holdings Ltd USD A Canyon Value Realization Cayman Ltd A Permal Fixed Income Holdings NV USD A Absolute Alpha Fund PCC Diversified Caxton Global Investments Ltd GAM U.S. Institutional Trading K4D-10V Portfolio K4D-15V Portfolio Orbis Optimal (US$) Fund GAM Trading II USD Open Double Black Diamond Ltd (Carlson) GoldenTree High Yield Master Fund Ltd Bay Resource Partners Offshore Fund Ltd GAM U.S. Institutional Diversity Firm Name Winton Capital Management Millennium Intl. Management Transtrend BV Genesis Investment Management Aspect Capital Aurora Investment Management Permal Asset Management Canyon Capital Advisors Permal Asset Management Financial Risk Management Caxton Associates GAM Sterling Management Graham Capital Management Graham Capital Management Orbis Investment Management GAM Sterling Management Carlson Capital Goldentree Asset Management GMT Capital Corp GAM Sterling Management Size ($Bil) 9.89 8.84 8.38 6.70 5.71 5.56 5.35 5.21 4.51 4.47 4.40 3.57 3.54 3.54 3.43 3.09 2.98 2.65 2.45 2.43 2001 7.11 15.26 26.36 4.62 15.79 9.82 14.66 12.69 11.50 9.33 31.41 16.34 6.45 39.31 29.01 14.78 11.94 18.30 29.32 9.56 2002 18.34 9.61 26.26 -1.77 19.19 1.31 8.03 5.21 10.47 6.36 26.44 10.69 18.76 43.71 12.15 10.55 2.12 6.24 0.03 4.95 2003 27.75 10.89 8.48 61.98 20.59 13.58 12.56 21.87 17.59 8.07 8.09 14.74 8.46 21.60 10.84 14.49 7.62 31.42 23.24 14.60 2004 22.63 14.68 12.82 31.53 -7.72 8.15 4.86 13.56 9.37 4.06 9.97 3.55 5.56 -0.43 2.25 3.84 4.70 9.89 27.97 6.14 2005 9.73 11.31 5.99 37.86 12.01 9.47 10.65 8.35 7.69 7.00 8.03 4.98 -7.52 -16.97 8.60 4.80 5.08 13.35 30.95 10.48 2006 17.83 16.43 12.04 30.22 12.84 10.95 9.48 14.08 10.48 8.94 13.17 8.68 5.02 6.64 4.95 7.44 21.12 13.21 21.65 16.74 2007 17.97 10.99 22.38 31.68 8.18 13.14 8.90 7.52 8.42 16.33 1.06 9.48 11.62 16.57 6.98 7.93 15.96 4.60 19.84 7.76 2008 20.99 -3.04 29.38 -49.30 25.42 -21.69 -5.16 -28.36 -18.40 -23.02 12.96 7.57 21.82 35.67 -2.49 5.78 -12.40 -38.60 -20.88 -13.96 2009 -4.63 16.28 -11.27 90.44 -11.24 21.26 9.83 55.20 27.32 10.51 5.83 8.32 1.41 3.11 9.92 6.55 28.34 69.94 56.60 6.78 2010 14.46 13.22 14.89 25.06 15.36 7.31 6.38 13.46 10.40 5.36 11.42 7.80 2.46 4.58 -3.93 5.97 9.30 23.61 15.90 -1.14 2011 6.29 8.39 -8.65 -15.29 4.51 -6.01 -3.27 -4.66 -5.28 -2.06 -2.40 -2.32 -4.11 -2.67 -4.19 -2.79 Source: Morningstar Hedge Fund Database, accessed January 2012.